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The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP—German Council 
on Foreign Relations) is Germany’s national foreign policy network. As an inde-
pendent, non-partisan and non-profit organization, the DGAP actively takes part 
in the foreign policy decision-making process at all levels and provides political 
advice. More than 1,800 members and over 80 companies and foundations sup-
port the DGAP.
The DGAP consists of  the Research Institute, the magazine 
 INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, and the library and documentation center.
The Research Institute works as a think-tank at the intersection of  politics, 
economy and science. It is interdisciplinary, service-oriented and concentrates on 
various aspects of  German and European policy-making. More than 20 scholars 
work in a total of  ten programs.
The Robert Bosch Stiftung is one of  the major German foundations associated 
with a private company. It holds 92 per cent of  the share capital of  Robert Bosch 
GmbH.  
Established in 1964, it represents the philanthropic endeavors of  Robert Bosch 
(1861-1942), focussing on the fields of  science, health, international relations, 
education, society, and culture. 
In Stuttgart, the foundation maintains the Robert-Bosch-Krankenhaus (Robert 
Bosch Hospital), the Dr. Margarete Fischer-Bosch Institute for Clinical Pharma-
cology, and the Institute for the History of  Medicine. 
Between 1964 and 2007, the foundation has made available approximately 840 
million euros for projects. In 2007, approximately 59 million euros were spent on 
project funding.
The “Center for Central and Eastern Europe of  the Robert Bosch Stiftung” 
has been in existence at the DGAP since 2007. In the founding patron’s spirit of  
understanding among nations, the Center runs discussions, seminars and projects 
on current political developments in Central and Eastern Europe. The Center 
supervises various programs of  the Robert Bosch Stiftung to promote and create 
a network of  future decision-makers and young scholars from Central Europe, 
Eastern Europe and Germany.
As a think tank and driving force, the “Center for Central and Eastern Europe 
of  the Robert Bosch Stiftung” generates new ideas and concepts and possesses 
the institutional know-how to implement innovative project models. The scholars 
working at the Center provide briefings and background analyses for politics and 
the media.
Markus Lux and Gereon Schuch (publishers)
Editor: Jula Pötter
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Welcoming Speech
by Dr. Ingrid Hamm, Member of  the Board of  Management of  the Robert Bosch Stiftung
In his famous lecture “Politics as a Vocation,” Max Weber wrote in 1919:
“One can say that three qualities are pre-eminently decisive for a politician: passion—a sense 
of  responsibility—judgment.”
This characterization holds true for Carl Friedrich Goerdeler as it does for few 
others. For this reason it is a great honor for us that since May 2007 our fellow-
ship program for young executives from Central and Eastern Europe carries a new 
name: Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-Kolleg.
From my perspective, it is the sense of  responsibility that manifested itself  in 
Goerdeler’s thoughts and actions that remains highly impressive today. Some time 
ago, Helmut Schmidt said in Tübingen that for him “one’s own conscience re-
mains the final authority” towards which one bears responsibility. The actions of  
Carl Friedrich Goerdeler and his comrades-in-arms reflect these questions of  con-
science, introspection, the meaning of  resisting evil and the sense of  what should 
come thereafter for the coexistence among people.
Even today, these actions must serve as a role model for us, and for those who 
bear political responsibility. This is the reason why our fellowship program for 
administrators from Central Europe was named after Carl Friedrich Goerdeler.
There are additional reasons that speak in favor of  this, particularly the close rela-
tionship between Robert Bosch and Carl Friedrich Goerdeler. At first glance there 
may seem little common ground between the Prussian civil servant Carl Friedrich 
Goerdeler and the Swabian entrepreneur Robert Bosch. Yet it was the Bosch 
Company that offered Goerdeler support for resistance activities between 1937 
and 1945 during the Second World War—incidentally, in close contact to Theodor 
Heuss. Despite all their personal differences, Bosch, Heuss and Goerdeler created 
a connection that went beyond rejecting National Socialism. They shared basic 
principles that also decisively shaped their sense of  justice and of  what was right 
and wrong.
Carl Friedrich Goerdeler assumed responsibility in one of  the most extreme situ-
ations which Germany had ever gone through. He not only resigned his position 
as mayor of  Leipzig in 1936 out of  protest against deeds committed by the local 
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National Socialists, but as one of  the co-founders of  the civilian circle of  conspir-
ators around July 20th, 1944 also penned memorandums on constitutional reorga-
nization and plans for a European Union.
And when all is said and done, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler was an administrative 
official: one could say that he was a local politician with heart and soul. After his 
beginnings in city administration in Solingen and as Second Mayor in Königsberg, 
he was elected Mayor of  Leipzig in 1930. And although local politics always con-
stituted a matter close to his heart, he was willing to take on greater tasks: the July 
20th resistance movement planned for him to assume the office of  Chancellor of  
the Republic in a government after a coup d’état.
The bond to Robert Bosch, the willingness to take on societal responsibility and 
actively shape the public sector also characterize the fellows of  the Carl Friedrich 
Goerdeler-Kolleg.
The fellowship program for young executives from Central and Eastern Europe 
was created in 2001. It promotes future leaders from Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia, and since 2008 Romania and Bulgaria as well, who get to know 
the work in German public administration as colleagues working alongside others 
and who intend to take on societal responsibility in their own countries upon their 
return. The graduates are given the tasks of  continuing to implement European 
standards in their own countries, participating in the build-up of  new institutions 
and deepening integration. You bear great responsibility, whether in allocating EU 
appropriations, combating corruption, setting up cross-border contacts or reform-
ing the administration. Your work contributes to the citizens’ trust in their state 
and democracy and is at the same time a contribution to a better understanding 
among nations.
Naming our program after Carl Friedrich Goerdeler is a distinction and an honor 
for both the foundation and the fellows. We hope it also contributes to making 
the historical significance of  the man it was named after known in more extended 
spheres of  young executives.
Speech by  
Marianne Meyer-Krahmer
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of the Robert Bosch Stiftung
Speech on the occasion of the ceremony for the naming of 
the Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-Kolleg on 24 May 2007
by Dr. Marianne Meyer-Krahmer
Honored guests, dear attendees,
This celebration belongs to you first and foremost, dear fellows, but you will un-
derstand if  I first express my pleasure and gratitude to the Robert Bosch Stiftung. 
Thus, on the occasion of  the ceremony for the naming of  the Carl Friedrich 
Goerdeler-Kolleg, I would like to bid a welcome once again to Dr. Gutberlet, Prof. 
Dr. Rogall and Dr. Hamm. You have not only given this day a ceremonial frame, 
you also enhance it with your presence. As the daughter of  Carl Friedrich Go-
erdeler, this pleases me most especially. At the same time, I am aware that when 
naming their fellowship program for young executives from Central and Eastern 
Europe, the Robert Bosch Stiftung was by no means thinking only of  the personal 
connections between Robert Bosch and my father—as important as they were—
and that it is certainly not just honorary commemoration that is being linked with 
my father’s name: after all, with the name the Stiftung is handing over to you, 
fellows of  the program, something like a political bequest. This is what I want to 
speak about in the following.
My father was born in the West Prussian town of  Schneidemühl (now: Piła) in 
1884. He became a lawyer, was an officer in the First World War and then became 
mayor of  Königsberg, today Kaliningrad, at the age of  35. In 1930, when he was 
46 years old, he was elected Mayor of  Leipzig. For him in this function it was a 
matter of  course to make his decisions after consultations with a democratically 
elected city council, and not to obey the wishes of  just one party. My father was 
a passionate representative of  local self-government; he stressed time and again 
that administration requires expert knowledge, but also closeness to the citizens, 
namely that citizens should be involved in their community’s essential decisions.
As is known, the National Socialists came to power in 1933 and were soon the 
only party allowed in Germany. You can imagine that given his basic outlook my 
father quickly found himself  in conflict with the regime, as he did not intend to 
accept the domination of  this radical party.
On the other hand, until 1935 he was still hoping to be able to have a mitigating 
influence on the leadership of  the NSDAP, especially as Hitler appointed him in 
1934 to the position of  Reich Commissar for price regulation, a function he had 
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already occupied under Chancellor Heinrich Brüning during the global economic 
crisis. It was in this function that he got to know Hitler’s irrevocable intentions: he 
was promoting the armaments industry in order to make Germany a leading great 
power once again. My father quickly realized that Hitler would not shy away from 
a war. What he found particularly alarming was that it was on the verge of  becom-
ing not a war between nations, but rather one between allegedly “superior” and 
“inferior” races. For Hitler, the Germans and the English belonged to the “supe-
rior” Germanic race with a natural claim to leadership. The inferior people were 
to be vanquished and dominated, for instance Jews, Slavs and people of  color. For 
Goerdeler, conducting such a war was a crime, and the domination of  the criminal 
Hitler regime a peril for all of  humanity.
Already in 1935, Hitler let my father know that he no longer set any value on his 
advice. In December 1936, my father resigned from his position as Mayor of  
Leipzig; in so doing he protested against a hush-hush operation in which the Nazis 
had removed a monument to the composer Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy. For 
the National Socialists, this composer was a Jew who for that very reason did not 
deserve such a monument. For my father, this action was cultural disgrace.
Now a decided opponent to the National Socialists, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler ad-
vocated above all to circumvent the war intended by Hitler. Like other opponents 
of  the regime, he traveled to England and France, later to the USA and Canada, 
and there warned of  the danger that derived from Adolf  Hitler. In those days it 
was unusual for a conservative politician to warn against his own country’s govern-
ment. The then governor of  the Bank of  England, Sir Montagu Norman, pointed 
out critically: “It’s not gentleman-like, speaking like this about your own govern-
ment.” But the foreign governments underestimated Hitler, accommodated him 
once again at the Munich Conference in September 1938, and forced Czechoslo-
vakia to cede Sudetenland to Germany. Eventually, with the invasion of  Poland on 
September 1, 1939 Hitler began the murderous Second World War.
I believe that for you as young Central and Eastern Europeans a document from 
Carl Friedrich Goerdeler from the first year of  this war is of  particular signifi-
cance. It is a memorandum from July 1940—by that point in time, the German 
army had already occupied Poland, France, Belgium and the Netherlands—bear-
ing the title “Moral State of  Affairs.” In it, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler addresses first 
and foremost the military leadership of  the German Reich. He cites their “great 
successes” and at the same time poses a critical question: What do your military 
successes signify in light of  the inhuman treatment of  the vanquished peoples? I 
quote: “The plans for forcible relocations in Poland, Norway, Alsace-Lorraine and 
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northern France are known. The scheme of  creating a density of  population in 
poor, industry-less East Poland corresponding to that of  Belgium, thus implying 
a slow death by starvation, of  pressing down on Poland with a primitive school 
education, is the most diabolical that has ever been systematically devised in the 
history of  mankind.”
As you all know, this abominable war found an end in May of  1945, and as my 
father had predicted, the war ended—for Germany too—in catastrophe. In the 
ice-cold winter of  1945, millions of  refugees trekked from East Prussia and Silesia 
towards the west.
But it was certainly not just the perception of  imminent defeat that drove my 
father and other regime opponents before him to attempt to end the Nazi system. 
They were in despair about the crimes that had been committed in the name of  
their people to other peoples and to the Jews. Thus my father ended a letter: “We 
must be grateful for exceeding mercy if  they ever forgive us.”
Perhaps you know of  the fact that on July 20, 1944 through Claus Schenk Graf  
von Stauffenberg’s assassination attempt a last attempt was dared to end the reign 
of  terror. The attempt miscarried, and Hitler took brutal revenge. My father 
too—and with him his entire family—was arrested; my father landed in excruciat-
ing solitary confinement. He was executed on February 2, 1945. Even during his 
Dr. Marianne Meyer-Krahmer with Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-Kolleg fellows
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six months in prison, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler was engaged with the future of  the 
continent, maltreated by the National Socialists, with ideas for a peaceful coexis-
tence of  Europe’s people; these now form part of  his political legacy.
And now I turn to you personally, dear members of  the Kolleg. I hope you will be 
able to contribute to shaping the political future of  your home countries in Carl 
Friedrich Goerdeler’s terms. And I would like to embolden you, based on my own 
experience from my long life, to truly shape. How much an individual can change 
became clear to me in 1990—almost half  a century after the collapse of  the Nazi 
regime—at a celebration on the occasion of  the fall of  the Berlin wall and Ger-
man reunification. The most important guest at this ceremony to which the city 
of  Leipzig had invited me was the Polish ambassador Janusz Reiter; towards him 
and towards Poland were directed gratitude for their contribution to the liberation 
from the GDR’s one-party rule. Without Lech Wałęsa, without the Polish strike 
movement, without the help of  the Hungarians, the people in the former GDR 
would not have achieved their freedom.
Many of  you, dear participants in the fellowship program, will return to your 
homeland after successfully completing the Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-Kolleg and 
take up your work again in local administration. In my long professional life, I 
have come to know the important tasks but also the pitfalls of  administrations. 
The purpose of  administration is to enable varied individuals a peaceful coexis-
Dr. Marianne Meyer-Krahmer in dialogue with Dr. Ingrid Hamm and Prof. Dr. Joachim Rogall
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tence by applying the same laws and regulations. In practice, however, you will 
keep being confronted with people who are not easy to integrate into the existing 
administrative schemes. I wish you all empathy, fantasy and courage to discover 
ways to satisfy the needs of  individuals. The German word “Verwaltung” [ad-
ministration] contains the word “Gewalt” [force]. One should keep reflecting on 
whether with administration one is also exerting force; a force that runs the risk of  
making the other person small so that you can feel big yourself. Thus I wish you 
personally all the best and that you will be able to achieve good things.
Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-Kolleg 
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Das Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-
Kolleg der Robert Bosch Stiftung
Markus Lux
Gereon Schuch
The Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-Kolleg—a fellowship program for 
young executives from Central Europe
by Markus Lux, M. A., program director, Robert Bosch Stiftung, and Dr. Gereon Schuch, 
head of  the DGAP’s Center for Central and Eastern Europe of  the Robert Bosch Stiftung
Europe is in an ongoing unification process. The accession of  ten states to the Eu-
ropean Union in May 2004 and two additional states in January 2008 implies major 
challenges for the public sector in the new member states—and also in the old ones. 
The Robert Bosch Stiftung, together with the Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-Kolleg, 
takes on the challenges of  the transformation process in the new member states of  
the European Union in an exemplary way; their intention is to contribute to coping 
with these tasks and at the same time to Germany’s understanding with its neigh-
bors in Central Europe.
The main objective of  the program is to enable qualified professional and intense 
cultural experience in the public sectors of  Germany and of  the EU, particularly 
in German public administration, for young executives who are striving to attain a 
professional leadership position and want to take on societal responsibility. It was 
first announced in 2001 for the countries of  Poland and the Czech Republic, and 
has since been expanded to include Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
The prerequisites for participation include, besides specific country citizenship, an 
excellent university degree and at least one year of  professional experience in the 
public sector (administrations, public companies, non-governmental organizations, 
etc.), as well as a sense of  societal responsibility, motivation, assertiveness and lead-
ership qualities. For actively working within German institutions, very good knowl-
edge of  German is of  course indispensable; improving it will be supported before 
and during the fellowship. Annually, up to 25 scholarships are available.
In the Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-Kolleg, the fellows get to know the public sector 
in Germany intensely during the program year (September–May) and familiar-
ize themselves with European regulations, usually by completing two-month to 
four-month internships in German authorities at the federal, state or local levels 
or at institutions in the economy and civil society and working as visiting col-
leagues. These stays are planned and implemented essentially in accordance with 
the fellows’ ideas and expectations. The stay is complemented by intensive seminar 
phases: thus at the start the participants receive a comprehensive introduction to 
the state and society of  Germany in Stuttgart and Berlin; they attend further train-
ing in leadership skills at a seminar in January; and they experience the institutions 
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and players of  the European Union in Brussels in March/April. Get-togethers to 
prepare, take stock and exchange experiences round off  the seminar offerings. In 
the process, the Kolleg fellows meet each other and participants in other founda-
tion fellowship programs on a regular basis. This connection with other programs 
fostering international young academics enables a broad network of  contacts. The 
Goerdeler-Kolleg fellows also serve as “ambassadors” of  their countries, commu-
nicating information about their home administrations and their home countries 
to their German partners.
Conducting such a program would certainly not be possible without the assistance 
of  competent partner institutions. For many years, the most important partner 
of  the Goerdeler-Kolleg has been the German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP). Since 2007, the DGAP has also established the Center for Central and 
Eastern Europe of  the Robert Bosch Stiftung. In the founding patron’s spirit of  
understanding among nations, the Center runs discussions, seminars and meet-
ings with experts and background discussions on current political developments 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Several of  the Robert Bosch Stiftung’s programs 
are supervised by the Center. This includes preparation and execution of  the 
seminars of  the Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-Kolleg in Berlin, Stuttgart and Brus-
sels. In addition, the foundation works closely with the DGAP in setting up the 
program, supporting the visiting fellows and coordinating the internships of  the 
Goerdeler-Kolleg.
Since 2001, 165 visiting fellows have benefited from the fellowship program; in 
most instances, they have returned to institutions in the public sector, some of  
them to EU institutions in Brussels. Many of  them make use of  the contacts to 
German colleagues and other former visiting fellows, thus accessing a functioning 
network. The Alumni Association SKARB, founded in 2002, organizes seminars 
and meetings for alumni and interested third parties once or twice a year. These 
regular get-togethers cement the contacts among the alumni and serve the pro-
gram’s further development, as the program itself  receives a significant impetus on 
an ongoing basis through the active collaboration of  the fellows and the alumni. 
By the same token, the alumni are called upon to share the knowledge they have 
acquired in Germany and the experience they have gathered in their home institu-
tions. That this can work beyond the borders of  their destination countries was 
impressively proven with an advanced training program for administration em-
ployees from the Western Ukraine, supported by Goerdeler-Kolleg alumni during 
their internships in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. When cooperating with Cen-
tral European authorities and institutions in the public sector, the German guest 
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institutions are also increasingly making use of  their contacts to the Kolleg fellows 
who have returned to their countries of  origin.
The participants’ experiences and the outcome of  the numerous evaluations lead 
to ongoing further development of  the program. For instance, the college charac-
ter of  the program was enhanced with optimized training sessions and seminars. 
While extending geographically to new target countries, an extension of  the target 
group also took place; by now, the group extends far beyond pure administration 
and also includes societally relevant institutions like non-governmental organiza-
tions, public companies and educational establishments. In addition, the coop-
eration with the DGAP was intensified to contribute to the advancement and 
networking of  future decision-makers and young scholars from Central Europe, 
Eastern Europe and Germany. In the future, an emphasis will be placed on the 
young scholars’ professional background and task areas. In this way, it is conceiv-
able to link the internship with specific participant projects in their originating 
institutions, as is a specific topic that would change each year as framework for the 
invitation to the Goerdeler-Kolleg.
Towards the outside world, the most obvious sign of  the change was renaming 
the institution “Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-Kolleg” in May 2007. The name serves 
to commemorate the excellent administrator and mayor of  Leipzig, Carl Friedrich 
Goerdeler, who worked for Bosch from 1937 until he was executed as one of  the 
Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-Kolleg fellows
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leading heads of  the “July 20th plot” in 1945. Robert Bosch, Theodor Heuss and 
Carl Friedrich Goerdeler were banded together by shared basic beliefs that shaped 
their sense of  what is right and wrong and challenged their moral courage. A will-
ingness to take on societal responsibility and actively shape the public space in the 
international context also characterizes the program’s participants. Thus the name 
Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-Kolleg is addressed not just towards future participants, 
but also expressly as a distinction for the activities of  the alumni.
Prof. Dr. Joachim Rogall and Dr. Heiner Gutberlet (from the left) when presenting certificates to  
the fellows
Carl Goerdeler and 
 Robert Bosch
1
Carl Friedrich Goerdeler-Kolleg 
of the Robert Bosch Stiftung
Sabine Gillmann
Carl Friedrich Goerdeler and Robert Bosch
by Dr. Sabine Gillmann, historian
In the time after the National Socialists seized power, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, lo-
cal and Reich politician who was later called the “motor of  the resistance,”1 con-
tracted a connection that may appear astonishing in retrospect: he worked for the 
Bosch Company, making use of  this appointment to expand his connections with 
foreign countries. This connection is astonishing because at first nothing seemed to 
link the two men. Even just a quick glance at the photos from the 1930’s shows two 
very different characters: on the one hand you see Bosch, over 70 years old, with a 
full beard and posed informally: a southern German democratic entrepreneur in the 
social-liberal tradition of  Friedrich Naumann. On the other hand you see Goerdeler, 
just turned 50, clean-shaven in a typical passport photo pose: a Prussian civil ser-
vant and administrative lawyer from the German national camp.
At first glance, there was no common ground between Carl Goerdeler and Robert 
Bosch. Nonetheless, the Bosch Company financed Goerdeler in the years between 
1 The designation of  Goerdeler as the “head and motor” of  the group of  civilian conspirators derives from the sentence of  
the People’s Court dated 8 September 1944 and was later taken over in academic research. Cf. the sentence of  the People’s 
Court dated 8 September 1944; reprinted in Hans-Adolf  Jacobsen (editor), Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20. 
Juli 1944. Geheime Dokumente aus dem ehemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt, 2 vol., special edition. Stuttgart 1989, p. 533 et seq. 
Cf. also Ger van Roon, Widerstand im Dritten Reich. Ein Überblick. 6th revised edition, Munich 1994, p. 132.
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1937 and 1945 and enabled him to conduct his resistance activities during the Sec-
ond World War. Despite the more than 20-year age difference, despite the differ-
ing geographical and social origins, despite their different political opinions, Bosch 
and Goerdeler created a bond that will be examined more closely in the following 
against the backdrop of  Carl Goerdeler’s biography. To this end, let us consider 
the three most important turning points of  this time period: the end of  the First 
World War 1918–19, the National Socialist takeover of  power in 1933, and the 
beginning of  the Second World War with the German invasion of  Poland in 1939. 
Where are Goerdeler and Bosch to be classified in these historical contexts; what 
opinions did they hold at these moments; and how did they view the events? And 
while searching for answers to these questions, finally, the question about the 
similarities between the two men will be pursued. What induced them to go into a 
connection that appears to us at first so very improbable?
The End of the First World War
At the end of  the First World War, before the Treaty of  Versailles was signed, 
Robert Bosch was already 58 years old, and his »Werkstätte für Feinmechanik und 
Elektrotechnik« [Workshop for Precision Mechanics and Electrical Engineering] 
had become the leading large firm in the German electrical industry: he employed 
more than 7,000 laborers and white-collar employees. Bosch was a typical pa-
triarchal entrepreneur, who felt himself  socially beholden to his workers but in 
return demanded achievement and obedience from them. His social management 
policies, in a manner of  speaking as an alternative to the socialist class struggle, 
included task wages and overtime pay, from 1906 onwards an 8-hour working day, 
also social protection and professional training offerings for his workers. He was 
interested in socialism—the moderate variant of  majority social democracy; he 
was left-liberal and a convinced democrat. He had no sympathies whatsoever for 
Emperor Wilhelm II, considered the world war a calamity and used the bulk of  
his war gains to finance the Neckar Canal and charitable foundations. Bosch was 
indeed a nationalist, but moderate through his support of  the League of  Nations 
founded in 1920. As a supporter of  the left-liberal Deutsche Demokratische Partei 
[German Democratic Party], he defended the Weimar Republic against attacks 
from the right, advocated German-French cooperation and hoped for a European 
Community. Bosch engaged himself  for the understanding among nations and in 
educational policy; he was one of  the main patrons of  the Hochschule für Politik 
[Institute of  Politics] in Berlin.2
2 For more on Bosch’s career in the German empire, cf. the still most reliable biography by Theodor Heuss: Robert Bosch. 
Leben und Leistung. 10th edition Stuttgart 1987. About Bosch’s engagement in the Weimar Republic cf. also Joachim 
Scholtyseck: Robert Bosch und der liberale Widerstand gegen Hitler 1933 bis 1945, Munich 1999, p. 87 et seq.
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Carl Goerdeler was more than 20 years younger than Bosch—born in West Prus-
sia in 1884, he spent his school and university years in East Prussia. His father was 
the third family generation of  lawyers working in the Prussian civil service, and 
Carl Goerdeler followed the same path. After finishing his studies he entered local 
politics; he experienced the First World War as field officer on the Eastern front.
After his demobilization in February 1919, the imminent cession of  his home-
land West Prussia to Poland as a consequence of  the Versailles Treaty induced 
him to get politically involved. In mid-June 1919, Goerdeler entered the crucial 
battle around appealing the Allied conditions of  peace, and he was instrumentally 
involved in preparing the “Aktion Frühlingssonne” [“Spring Sun” Action]: An 
advance of  the German army and volunteer troops to Warsaw was planned, with 
the intention of  ushering in the conquest of  all of  Poland. Goerdeler represented 
an extreme position in the constellation, adopting the demand for a “military pros-
tration of  Poland” and thus going along with the military officers’ most extensive 
planning.
Unlike his comrades-in-arms, who turned away from the young republic after 
such plans failed and the peace treaty was signed, Goerdeler reacted pragmatically: 
from his basic national-conservative outlook and stemming from the Prussian civil 
servant tradition, Goerdeler found his way to a government-friendly attitude; a 
fundamental rejection remained alien to him.3
Once again by way of  comparison: in the time immediately after the war, we see 
Bosch as a left-liberal democrat, who welcomes the Weimar Republic and supports 
the Deutsche Demokratische Partei [German Democratic Party]; he promotes 
educational institutions and organizations fostering international understanding. 
At the same time we see Goerdeler, who can resign himself  to the new republic 
only with an effort and who will become a so-called “rational republican”; he joins 
the Deutschnationale Volkspartei [German National People’s Party], thus initially 
committing himself  to the right fringe of  the republic’s spectrum of  parties.
The National Socialist Seizure of Power
We will consider the turning point of  the National Socialist seizure of  power in 
1933 against the backdrop of  the same questions as 1919: Where do Bosch and 
Goerdeler stand now, and what opinions do they hold in this time of  upheaval?
When Hitler became Reich Chancellor, Robert Bosch was preoccupied with com-
pletely different activities: in the winter of  1932, he once and for all reached the 
3 On Goerdeler’s participation in the “Spring Sun Action” cf. his report about it in BAK, N 1113, Vol. 21.
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conviction that the official diplomatic efforts of  Germany and France at reconcili-
ation had to be promoted through personal dedication. In December he traveled 
to a meeting with like-minded French industrialists, from which he returned in 
a very optimistic frame of  mind. His declared goal was a “close federation” of  
the two nations, which was intended to smooth the way to a European economic 
block. For Bosch, the German-French agreement was thus an important prereq-
uisite for a more comprehensive international understanding. At the same time he 
declared in a personal letter: “I am less interested in the things going on domes-
tically, probably simply for the reason that I see I cannot help there at all.” His 
attention at this time was so strongly focused on his foreign policy efforts that he 
practically blocked out domestic policy events. In addition, there were errors of  
judgment, as when Bosch initially made plans to win Hitler over for his politics 
of  understanding: in February 1933 he wrote that the right moment had come for 
Hitler to make an offer of  understanding to France.4
Bosch had never come to grips with the propaganda of  the National Socialists; his 
political judgment was directed more towards individual politicians. He may well 
have become more critical of  German parliamentarianism, as did many others 
towards the end of  the Weimar Republic, but he was nonetheless fundamentally 
optimistic, the more so as he saw the end of  the economic crisis within reach. 
However, the appointment of  a National Socialist state government in Wuerttem-
berg in March 1933, resulting in planned and arbitrary persecutions, suspensions 
from office and arrests, did bring Bosch face to face with the changed political 
situation. For some time it was discussed in the company’s board of  directors 
whether Bosch should go abroad to evade a possible arrest. Bosch feared reprisals, 
particularly from Wuerttemberg’s National Socialists. However, he believed Hitler’s 
appeasing words at first, and into the following years, it was a mixture of  being 
taken in and deluding himself. The first years under National Socialism are char-
acterized by ambivalence, in which criticism and praise, rejection and acceptance 
were mixed.5
In the meanwhile, Carl Goerdeler first went to Königsberg as Second Mayor; from 
1930 he was Mayor of  Leipzig. After the National Socialist takeover of  power on 
January 30, 1933, he remained in office, although he was one of  the few metropol-
itan mayors who was not a member of  the NSDAP. While the new government of  
the German Reich courted him to work with it in both economic policy and local 
constitutional law, working together with the local National Socialists in Leipzig 
proved to be increasingly difficult. Goerdeler got into increasing tension with the 
4 Cf. letter from Robert Bosch to Wilhelm Keppler; quoted from Heuss, Robert Bosch (note 2), p. 567.
5 Scholtyseck, Robert Bosch (note 2), p. 120.
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party members, particularly with his deputy, who called himself  the “first respon-
sible party member in Town Hall.” As Goerdeler found himself  in ever greater 
opposition to the government of  the Reich, his possibilities to win recognition 
in Leipzig worsened. On November 25, 1936, when the Mendelssohn-Bartholdy 
monument was removed from in front of  the Leipzig Gewandhaus [Concert Hall] 
during his absence and against his explicit instructions, Goerdeler drew the conse-
quences and submitted his petition of  resignation.6
Once again by way of  comparison: in the phase of  the takeover of  power, we 
see Bosch strongly withdrawn from domestic politics; there are even reports that 
describe him as “surprised” by the seizure of  power. He continues to be intensely 
involved in educational policy projects and in the policy of  understanding with 
France. Both Bosch and Goerdeler are ambivalent towards the new regime. In 
both cases, it is clear that they first have greater difficulties with the local National 
Socialists than with the Reich government. Goerdeler even hoped at first to have a 
stronger say in the policies of  the Reich.
The Beginning of the Cooperation between Bosch and Goerdeler
There are various policy fields in which Goerdeler cooperated with the Nazi 
regime: at first there was a reform of  the Municipal Code in 1933–34, with which 
6 Cf. on this in detail Ines Reich: Carl Friedrich Goerdeler. Ein Oberbürgermeister gegen den NS-Staat, Cologne and others 1997, 
p. 257 et seq.
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he wanted to force through an authoritarian constitution of  the mayor’s office. His 
assistance, however, did not lead to the results he had hoped for, and he was very 
critical of  the German Municipal Code of  January 1935. This was his first coop-
eration with the National Socialist government, and it ended with disillusionment. 
He also resigned from his function as price commissar in July 1935 with the sober-
ing insight that it was not possible to reach any agreement about his competences 
with the competing Reich authorities. A year later, in the summer of  1936, he was 
forced to recognize that he would not be able to prevail with his liberal economic 
convictions in the increasingly dirigiste Nazi economic policy making.7
Goerdeler’s disaffection from the Nazi regime in the second half  of  the 1930’s 
emanated from both sides: at first the National Socialists availed themselves of  
both Goerdeler’s eminence and his expertise in economic and local policy matters. 
Only once it became clear that he would engage with the regime’s policies in only 
a limited way, and only when the regime was sufficiently consolidated, was the rup-
ture with Goerdeler condoned, or in fact even forced. Right from the start, Goer-
deler had conflated hopes and fears in equal measure with the National Socialist 
seizure of  power: hope of  an increasing scope of  influence for himself, fears that 
were quickly confirmed. At the time of  the seizure of  power he was almost 50 
years old, at the height of  his career—he was a politician who wanted to have a 
say and influence. Then too, an attitude of  refusal was alien to him as a Prussian 
official and he also had considerable financial obligations as the father of  a fam-
ily. His basic attitude did not change at first, even after 1936, after Goerdeler had 
fallen out of  favor with the government of  the Reich and had resigned from his 
prestigious position as mayor of  Leipzig. External circumstances changed: at the 
age of  52 he had to cast about for a new position.
Already in the spring of  1936, Goerdeler was negotiating about his admittance to 
the three-man Krupp board of  directors, but this failed due to Hitler’s objection. 
From the summer of  1936, Goerdeler was also in contact with representatives of  
the Bosch Company; this contact came about via Theodor Bäuerle, with whom 
Goerdeler had been familiar since the 1920s and who was charged by Bosch with 
heading up institutions for adult education. Shortly after Krupp retracted their 
offer, an informal contractual relationship was established between Goerdeler and 
Robert Bosch and Goerdeler became an advisor to the company in financial issues 
and their representative to the Berlin authorities, though without sharply defined 
obligations.8 How did it happen that Hitler obstructed Goerdeler’s hiring at Krupp, 
7 Cf. Politische Schriften und Briefe Carl Friedrich Goerdelers, edited by Sabine Gillmann, Hans Mommsen, München 
2003, p. 261 et seq.
8 Cf. the memorandum from Hans Walz, »Meine Mitwirkung an der Aktion Goerdeler«, in: Widerstand und Erinnerung. Neue 
Berichte und Dokumente vom inneren Kampf  gegen das Hitler-Regime, edited by Otto Kopp, Stuttgart 1966, pp. 95–120.
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but accepted his appointment at Bosch? This fact can probably only be explained 
with the differing mentality of  the two entrepreneurs: in pre-emptive obedience 
Krupp had asked Hitler whether engaging Goerdeler would meet his approval. 
Such subordinate behavior was alien to Bosch. Upon hiring Goerdeler, he present-
ed the National Socialist rulers with a fait accompli.9
Supported by Robert Bosch and his oppositional circle in Stuttgart, Goerdeler 
ventured on extended journeys abroad in the years before the war to build up 
connections and influence European policies toward Germany as he saw fit. In 
lengthy reports to Göring and Hitler, he warned at the same time against underes-
timating England and France and pointed out the negative impact abroad of  Nazi 
policies regarding the church and the Jews.10
The Outbreak of the Second World War
With the German invasion of  Poland on September 1, 1939 our last turning point 
arrives, the beginning of  the Second World War. Bosch had hoped until the very 
end not to have to live to see a repeat of  the First World War. The failure of  his 
hopes for peace also meant the failure of  his decades of  work for the understand-
ing among nations, since he was certain that the war would hardly end with a 
victory over Poland. The outbreak of  war, however, also signified for Bosch the 
necessity to safeguard his assets held abroad—here Goerdeler played an important 
role as mediator; he was also able to take an opportunity to keep alive the image 
of  an “other Germany” on his journeys abroad.11
Even during the spring and early summer of  1939, Goerdeler had hoped through 
foreign interventions to have a moderating impact on the National Socialist 
politics and thus to stave off  imminent war. At the same time, from 1939 he 
increasingly strived to build up contacts with other critics of  the regime. Not least 
because of  Goerdeler’s untiring search for contact, other personalities and groups, 
linked at first primarily by their opposition to war, rallied around the three-man 
group of  Carl Goerdeler, Ludwig Beck and Ulrich v. Hassell. While the attempts 
to prevent an expansion of  war were at first supported by the emerging military 
opposition its attitude changed after the victory over France.
Goerdeler’s memorandums of  1940 are to be read against the backdrop of  the eu-
phoria of  victory in Germany; he held to his opposition to war and criticized the 
National Socialist conduct of  war and occupation policy quite strongly. His status 
9 Cf. on this the correspondence between Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and the Chancellery of  the Reich; HA 
Krupp, FAH 4 E 154.
10 A selection of  the travel accounts is printed in Politische Schriften und Briefe Carl Friedrich Goerdelers, p. 525 et seq.
11 Ibid.
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reports from the second half  of  1940 represent unusually severe opinions for the 
period of  successful National Socialist warfare and significantly differentiate him 
from other conservative critics of  the regime, such as von Hassell or Popitz. While 
the Prussian Minister of  Finance Johannes Popitz was leaning towards the Reich’s 
National Socialist thinking from the constitutional law side, von Hassell, who was 
influenced by the thought of  Central Europe, set his sights on a European reorga-
nization in which southeast Europe was to serve as an economic “Extended Re-
gion” of  the German Reich. In contrast, in his status reports Goerdeler attempted 
to draft a positive counter-image to the Nazi regime with his plans for a European 
Union.12
We refer once again to Goerdeler’s participation in an attempted “military pros-
tration of  Poland” in the year 1919—21 years later, when just this demand had 
been fulfilled by the German armed forces, one can read something different in 
Goerdeler:
»Someone who has brought about the conditions in administration and economy, in law and 
culture, in the upbringing of  youth and in morals in his own country—conditions which have 
yet to be described separately—or someone who has simply allowed these to develop, according 
to an immutable law of  nature does not become wise and moderate after his conquest, but 
rather ever more ambitious, brutal and obsessed with conquest. The plans for forcible reloca-
tions in Poland, Norway, Alsace-Lorraine and northern France are known. The scheme of  
creating a density of  population in poor, industry-less East Poland corresponding to that of  
Belgium, thus implying a slow death by starvation, of  pressing the Poles down with a primi-
tive school education restricted to the ages of  7 to 12, without middle and higher schools, is 
the most diabolical that has ever been systematically devised in the history of  mankind. (…) 
A foreign policy situation is not equivalent to a military situation. Militarily, additional, in-
deed the most extreme successes may be possible. For the future of  our people, these successes 
have lost their significance. Success will only be determined by whether we succeed in time in 
establishing morality, justice and truth in public order, finances and economy. What foreign 
policy fruit can be picked ensues from the proper treatment of  all other peoples, the timely 
dying away of  the feelings of  hate and contempt which are erupting around us.”13
Thus already in November 1940, Goerdeler prognosticated that the war, irre-
spective of  its outcome, would have to end in catastrophe. A military victory on 
Germany’s part would be meaningless in view of  the stated moral breakdown; a 
12 Cf. on this also in detail Sabine Gillmann, Die Europapläne Carl Goerdelers. Neuordnungsvorstellungen im nationalkonservativen 
Widerstand zwischen territorialer Revision und europäischer Integration, in: Thomas Sandkühler (ed.): Europäische Integration. 
Deutsche Hegemonialpolitik gegenüber Westeuropa 1920–1960, Göttingen 2002, p. 77 et seq. (= Beiträge zur Geschichte des Natio-
nalsozialismus, Vol. 18).
13 The memorandum is printed in its entirety in: Politische Schriften und Briefe Carl Friedrich Goerdelers (note 7), pp. 769–777, 
and here pp. 29–36.
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military defeat of  Germany would have terrible consequences given how warfare 
and occupation policy had been conducted.
The status reports from 1940 signify a turning point in Goerdeler’s writings in 
several respects: firstly, they signal a final step towards resistance to the Nazi 
regime. Goerdeler had indeed already acted in opposition during the preceding 
years through his resignation in Leipzig, his increasing criticism of  the regime and 
through the aims of  his journeys abroad; but with the German invasion of  Poland 
the juncture has been reached at which he turns away completely from the re-
gime. Secondly, the 1940 status reports show Goerdeler’s intensified turn towards 
Europe, towards plans for a European Community. He expanded these plans in 
the following years. The federative element was constitutive in them—the volun-
tary federation of  equal states, whose representation towards the outside world 
was to be shaped in an increasingly joint fashion, while national sovereign powers 
decreased in significance. Here too there were similarities with Robert Bosch’s 
views. The third point to emphasize here is the moral integrity that speaks from 
Goerdeler’s writings. One should keep in mind that Goerdeler had fought and 
argued against the Polish “corridor” and the division of  his Prussian homeland 
after the Versailles Treaty. 20 years later, once his aim has been achieved with the 
German invasion of  Poland, he orients himself  against it and refuses to take part 
in the German euphoria of  victory. A moral-ethical basis in accordance with the 
rule of  law becomes evident in Goerdeler, something which is very impressive.
Even though Goerdeler’s travels naturally decreased during the war years, he 
remained relatively mobile through his position for Bosch. His conviction that 
under the National Socialist regime the war could not—and should not—be won 
resulted in the composition of  numerous texts with which he hoped to win allies 
against the regime.
Bosch’s Death and Goerdeler’s Execution
In September 1941, Bosch celebrated his 80th birthday in Baden-Baden, a celebra-
tion to which Goerdeler was also invited. For the celebration, Goerdeler wrote a 
commemorative speech for Bosch in which he honored his life’s work.14 Only a 
few months later, Bosch fell ill; he then died in March 1942. In the years before, 
he had already increasingly withdrawn from the company management so that his 
death did not signify any change in company policies. The company’s close con-
nection to Goerdeler also persisted and the personal loss did not bring about any 
change in Goerdeler’s employment relationship.
14 Cf. Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, Robert Bosch zum 80. Geburtstag, in: Die Deutsche Rundschau (October 1941); a copy of  
the essay can be found in Goerdeler’s estate in the German Federal Archive (BAK N 1113/39, Vol. 4).
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While Goerdeler was setting out and explaining his concepts for a new structure 
of  the state to his fellow conspirators, from 1943 onwards he strived increasingly 
to find attentive ears among the Allies. With writings to the British government, he 
aimed to provide the foreign policy basis for his plans for a new domestic political 
order. In particular, he targeted the retraction of  the demand for unconditional 
surrender made by the Allies at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.15
In the course of  the years 1942 and 1943, a series of  documents were developed 
that were intended to provide a basis for the planned takeover of  government. 
The group of  civilian conspirators around Goerdeler drafted lists for the political 
representatives and liaison officers for the military districts and formulated first 
announcements of  the revolutionary government. These were programmatic bul-
letins, tantamount to manifestos for the time after the planned takeover of  gov-
ernment. While from the civilian side, the preparations were thus concluded for a 
coup d’état, the conspirators waited for the military spark.16
Another year and a half  passed, and the military situation in National Socialist 
Germany got significantly worse before the military actually became active. Goer-
deler was planned as the new Chancellor for the time after the assassination on 
July 20, 1944. The events are well-known—the assassination attempt failed, the 
planned overthrow of  the government was uncovered and Goerdeler was forced 
to flee. It can be seen in the so-called “Kaltenbrunner-Berichte” [Kaltenbrunner 
Reports] that Goerdeler’s position within the civilian conspiracy was known to the 
Nazi regime by July 25 at the latest. From August 1, 1944, a bounty of  a million 
Reichsmark was placed for his apprehension; on August 12—by then Goerdeler 
was staying in East Prussia—he was recognized and immediately arrested. Goer-
deler was sentenced to death by the People’s Court on September 8, 1944 as a 
“traitor” and “political war spy.” While the death sentences against his co-defen-
dants Ulrich von Hassell, Paul Lejeune-Jung and Josef  Wirmer were carried out on 
the afternoon of  the very same day, almost five months of  harsh imprisonment 
in the Gestapo prison in Prinz-Albrecht-Straße in Berlin passed until Goerdeler’s 
execution.17
15 Cf. Goerdeler’s position paper for the British government; printed in: Politische Schriften und Briefe Carl Friedrich Goerdelers 
(note 7), pp. 944–949.
16 The conviction of  the civilian group of  plotters that there would be no course of  action for them without a military 
spark becomes clear in an exemplary way in the diaries of  Goerdeler’s co-conspirator Ulrich v. Hassell. Cf. for instance 
the diary entry from April 20, 1943; Ulrich v. Hassell: Die Hassell-Tagebücher 1938–1944. Aufzeichnungen vom Andern 
Deutschland. Edition revised and expanded acc. to the manuscript with the cooperation of  Klaus Peter Reiß, ed. by Fried-
rich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen, Berlin 1988, p. 363.
17 Cf. the sentence of  the People’s Court of  September 8, 1944, loc. cit. (note 1). Cf. also Otto Thierack’s telegraphed mes-
sage to Martin Bormann dated September 8, 1944; BAB, NJ 17548, Vol. 2.
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Goerdeler apparently received news while he was imprisoned that his entire fam-
ily had been taken into “Sippenhaft” [a form of  collective responsibility whereby 
family members are liable for the misdeeds of  their relatives]. He knew that his 
assets had been confiscated and that he would leave his family destitute. Ap-
parently he was also informed that his grandchildren—both infants—had been 
deported. In addition to the emotional torments that anxiety about his family must 
have caused him, there were physical deprivations. From the reports of  survivors, 
Goerdeler’s descriptions of  the external conditions have been confirmed: solitary 
confinement and inadequate provisions, blinding light that shined in the cells all 
night, the constant use of  handcuffs and the psychological wearing down through 
targeted leaking of  information. During his incarceration, Goerdeler, like his 
detained fellow conspirator Johannes Popitz, wrote a series of  memoranda upon 
the request of  the Nazi regime. He was to answer questions on reconstruction 
and write memoranda on price control and setting up administration. Through 
his writing, Goerdeler was probably hoping for a deferment of  the execution of  
his death sentence, which, with a rapid victory by the Allies, could have led to his 
liberation; in addition, the activity gave him the possibility to draw up secret notes, 
in which he again summarized his ideas and cleared himself  against his conviction 
as a “war spy.” During his long incarceration, Goerdeler also wrote an extensive 
series of  private writings. In them, he grappled with the dictatorship and his own 
role in it, described the aims of  the group of  conspirators and summarized his 
Robert Bosch
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ideas about a new political order. In all his writings, his concern about his fam-
ily also emerges—besides the request to German and foreign friends to assist his 
family, financial arrangements and suggestions for his descendants can also be 
found.18 As one of  the last main parties involved in the July 20, 1944 conspiracy, 
Carl Goerdeler was executed in Berlin-Plötzensee on February 2, 1945.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we return once again to the initial question: What do the conserva-
tive Prussian civil servant Carl Goerdeler and the left-liberal industrialist Robert 
Bosch have in common?
Some of  their common ground should have become clear in this essay; it can be 
recapitulated on the basis of  the commemorative speech that Goerdeler held for 
Bosch’s 80th birthday in September 1941, a few months before Bosch’s death:
Initially, the two were linked by their liberal economic mindset. Goerdeler empha-
sized in his writings that free competition and individual initiative were the basic 
preconditions for a flourishing economy. He stressed these aspects as well in his 
commemorative speech as Bosch’s “secret of  success”: individual achievement as 
criterion for possibilities to advance and receive further training, task wages and an 
upbringing towards a joy in responsibility. The two of  them also called for a free 
economic system from an international perspective: the ideal image was an open 
world economy with free competition.
The second commonality was their dedication to international understanding 
between nations—Bosch advocated it from the end of  the First World War; for 
Goerdeler the realization came only later, during his journeys abroad, before and 
during the Second World War.
As the third and most important common element between the two of  them, I see 
an ability to know right from wrong, one that they continued to assert unwavering-
ly even under the Nazi regime. The Nazi regime was indeed based on written texts 
with the formal quality of  law, starting with the “Enabling Act” of  1933. What is 
intended with the term “sense of  right and wrong” for Goerdeler and Bosch is 
their conviction that there is an autonomous validity and sovereignty of  law. It was 
their belief  in this autonomy of  the law that led to them to turn away from unlaw-
ful appropriation of  the law by the National Socialists. The sovereignty of  the law 
was invoked by both of  them against the claims set by the state.
18 A selection of  Goerdeler’s late writings is printed in: Politische Schriften und Briefe Carl Friedrich Goerdelers (note 7), p. 1192 et 
seq.
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Goerdeler corroborated this legal opinion in his commemorative speech for Rob-
ert Bosch, in which he summarized his conviction:
“A man of  character can, like all great men in German history, only stand up for law and 
freedom, for law and the freedom of  the individual, for law and the freedom of  the people. 
What he wants to accomplish for his own people, he must accord to other peoples as well, in 
accordance with eternal laws.”19
19 Cf. Carl Friedrich Goerdeler: Robert Bosch zum 80. Geburtstag (note 14); a copy of  the essay can be found in Goerdeler’s 
estate in the German Federal Archive (BAK N 1113/39, Vol. 4).
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Moral State of Affairs
Typewritten memorandum by Carl Friedrich Goerdeler
1 July 1940
The Wehrmacht has proven, thanks to excellent planning by the General Staff, 
thanks to brilliant leadership, thanks to the soldiers’ courage and not least thanks 
to the most ruthless deployment of  destructive technology, what they are able to 
achieve. This victory gives them great power and even greater responsibility.2
Wars may not be fought for their own sake. Moltke himself  emphasized this, 
Clausewitz and all the great statesmen and military leaders have acknowledged 
it,3 reason and a sense of  responsibility tell us this. The aim is always only honor-
able and happy peace. The honor is contained in our respect for ourselves, in our 
independence from alien will. Peace is happy that leads to an adequate status of  
life upon exerting all one’s efforts, enables one to improve it, ensures freedom of  
conscience and progress of  science, keeps emotional powers in balance and en-
ables the development of  real culture: only that peace will be lasting in which man 
does not slacken and does not forget that he is subject to the commandments and 
the authority of  God.
We are more distant from such a peace today than ever; it is necessary to attain 
full, albeit dreadful clarity about this. This is because this war is not serving a well-
planned build-up, but rather fantastic plans, last entertained in Napoleon’s times. 
This war would not be needed at all to have that type of  peace. It can be substanti-
1 This memorandum is cited in accordance with: Politische Schriften und Briefe Carl Friedrich Goerdelers, ed. by Sabine Gillmann, 
Hans Mommsen, Munich 2003. Goerdeler did not give it a title; in later writings, however, he refers to it by the name 
“Moral State of  Affairs.”
2 At the time this memorandum originated, the German Armed Forces was registering victories on all fronts: Poland, 
Norway, Holland and Belgium had been conquered, and Denmark had been occupied without a struggle; France was 
divided into occupied and unoccupied parts with a conservative authoritarian collaboration government. The reports 
of  military success seemed to confirm the National Socialist Blitzkrieg strategy and gave the impression of  almost unre-
stricted possibilities of  expansion, which threw the better part of  the German people into a frenzy of  victory. Cf. for an 
overview Lothar Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Kriegführung und Politik, 10th revised and updated edition Munich 1995, 
and Gerhard L. Weinberg, Eine Welt in Waffen. Die globale Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs, Stuttgart 1995.
3 Helmut Graf  von Moltke (1800–1891), as Prussian Field Marshal General and as head of  the large General Staff, 
made a decisive contribution to the victories over Austria in 1866 and over France in 1870–71. Carl von Clausewitz 
(1780–1831), at first also a Prussian general and after the conclusion of  the French-Prussian military alliance in 1812 
in Russian service, was interested in military-theoretical-philosophical issues and taught at the Allgemeine Kriegsschule 
[General War Academy] in Berlin from 1818 onwards. With his treatise Vom Kriege [On War] Clausewitz argued for the 
primacy of  political leadership as opposed to the military by characterizing war as the continuation of  politics by dif-
ferent means. Moltke, on the other hand, like many of  his contemporaries, though he accepted and adopted Clausewitz’ 
military-theoretical explanations, granted the military sector a role more independent from the civilian sector. Moltke 
argued the notion of  an autonomy of  war, whose outbreak is indeed determined by politics but that is subordinate to 
all politics while it lasts. Cf. Volkmar Regling, Grundzüge der Landkriegführung zur Zeit des Absolutismus und im 19. Jahrhundert, 
in: Deutsche Militärgeschichte, Vol. 6, pp. 11–425; on Clausewitz pp. 307–327, on Moltke pp. 379–425, and Jan Philipp 
Reemtsma, Die Idee des Vernichtungskrieges. Clausewitz – Ludendorff  – Hitler, in: Hannes Heer und Klaus Neumann (ed.), 
Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941–1944, Hamburg 1995, pp. 377–401.
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ated at any time that the allied western powers, at least since 1932, were prepared 
to reach an understanding on all the questions that are essential for us, as would 
have satisfied our honor and our vital force. In particular, it can be proven that 
Poland, placed under pressure by England, consented on August 31, 1939 to ne-
gotiate in an accommodating way about the eastern issues.4 Upon comparing the 
forces of  Germany and Poland, this accommodation could have very soon been a 
perfect one, as well given the allied western powers’ desire for peace. But the Reich 
leadership preferred war, because they wanted it and had to have it.
The opinion that the English merchants want this war due to envy is a sentiment. 
The fact is that since 1925 precisely English merchants have been influencing 
the English government towards a peaceful accommodation most strongly. No 
businessman, and least of  all an Englishman, denies that only an organic or bal-
anced peace can revive trade and create possibilities for profit, that modern total 
war destroys more prosperity and possibilities of  development than can be reaped 
in temporary profits. In the City of  London of  all places we have heard again and 
again at least until 1939 (the occupation of  Czechoslovakia) that they saw in Hitler 
the great savior from bolshevism, the welcome destroyer of  inconvenient unions 
and workers’ demands.
In the light of  the excessive and senseless hate propaganda against England, 
decency demands that we stand up for those Englishmen who have proven to 
be honorable, peace-seeking people—and that is the great majority. The claim 
that one must crush England to have peace in Europe is particularly contrary to 
truth and senseless. Name a war wanted by England before 1914 that was di-
rected against German interests. Friedrich the Great won his wars against Austria 
through the alliance with England. The liberation of  Prussia from Napoleonic 
subjugation would not have been possible or would only have been possible later 
or would not have been possible so completely without the cooperation of  En-
gland based on sharing the same interests; England did not hold it against Prussia 
that they were compelled by Napoleon to be in official enmity against England in 
1807–13. The quick and successful consummation of  the war of  1870–71 would 
not be conceivable without England’s favorable neutrality. Precisely the 19th 
century proved that a long-lasting, happy peace was possible in Europe by drawing 
4 Despite the termination of  the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact in April 1939 as well as the German-Soviet Non-
Aggression Pact concluded four months later, Poland appeared very willing to compromise even at the end of  August. 
It was already evident to contemporary observers that Great Britain’s feverish attempts at mediation even on August 
31, 1939 fell through due almost exclusively to the provocative behavior of  the National Socialists. Cf. the very detailed 
depiction of  the sequence of  negotiations in the last days of  August in Horst Rohde, Hitlers Erster »Blitzkrieg« und seine 
Auswirkungen auf  Nordosteuropa, in: Klaus A. Maier, Horst Rohde, Bernd Stegmann and Hans Umbreit, Die Errichtung der 
Hegemonie auf  dem Europäischen Kontinent, Stuttgart 1979, p. 85 et seq.
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on England.5 In conclusion, it can assuredly be proven from the archives and the 
recollections of  contemporaries which are awaiting publication that since the turn 
of  the century England has sought and attempted to create a basic understanding 
numerous times, indeed even a cooperative alliance in a way that would certainly 
not impede Germany’s development.
In the eyes of  history, it will not be possible to place the responsibility for this 
war on others; the German Reich government wanted it and consciously conjured 
it up. It will also be proven that there is no national interest in obliterating this 
matter of  fact. Had England and France remained neutral, they would have fallen 
under the knife in 1940 or 1941 without fail. This is because the leadership of  the 
Reich has been following plans of  conquest since 1938, plans which only fools 
could deny would have to come into conflict with France’s and England’s vital 
interests. This leadership, not Germany, was at its wits’ end financially and eco-
nomically. Its financial and economic policy—which defy all laws of  nature and 
reason—had led us, as could be predicted, into scarcity and price increases. This 
was already perceptible from 1938 onwards. Even without war, they would have 
had to implement [food ration] cards last winter and let the people freeze. As the 
consequence of  war, a people puts up with such a situation for some time; as the 
contents of  peacetime such a situation drives them to dissatisfaction and ulti-
mately to turning away. No one knows this better than the current rulers. Instead 
of  doing their patriotic duty of  returning to reason or relinquishing power, they 
chose war, thus setting down the path of  all such dictatorships.
Let us allege that the island of  England too will be wrestled down; let us allege 
that America is not conducting the war, namely that they’re asleep; let us allege 
that the others are signing some type of  peace; indeed let us allege that we are 
repelling or overthrowing bolshevism. Let us allege that Germany has military 
control over the region from the North Cape to the Cape of  Good Hope, from 
the Atlantic to the Dnieper or the Ural, that the German people can wage the 
wars necessary to do this and display the power necessary for this on an ongoing 
basis without depletion and without emotional damage. Even with this optimum 
of  military successes and political displays of  power, the European peoples liv-
ing in this region could only cover the necessities of  life—after essentially 10–20 
years—if  all nations in this region were to work wonders. This, however, is only 
5 While Goerdeler’s appraisal of  the German-British relationship in the 19th century is comprehensible, the Prussian-
Austrian Wars under Friedrich the Great are if  anything an unfortunate example. The British victory over France in 
1743 and the decision of  the War of  the Austrian Secession in Maria Theresia’s favor provoked the Second Silesian War 
between Austria and Prussia in 1744–45. The British participation in the Seven Years’ War (1756–63) on Prussia’s side 
was likewise not unproblematic, as Great Britain through separate peace negotiations with France and through the dis-
continuation of  subsidy payments to Prussia significantly jeopardized Prussia’s situation. Cf. in summary Hans-Joachim 
Schoeps, Preußen. Geschichte eines Staates, Frankfurt/M. und Berlin 1966, p. 62 et seq.; p. 132 et seq.; p. 238 et seq.
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possible if  their honor and their political freedom are preserved so that these 
peoples consider this wider area and a shared economy within it as serving their 
own best interests.
A system that in Germany lives from financial madness, from economic force, 
from political terror, from lawlessness and immorality, that consigns youth ever 
more systematically to ignorance and arrogance, that treats Christian thinking, 
feeling and acting with scorn and even persecutes it does not think about such an 
inventive structure of  free peoples under German leadership.
The plans for forcible relocations in Poland, Norway, Alsace-Lorraine and north-
ern France are known.6 The scheme of  creating a density of  population in poor, 
industry-less East Poland corresponding to that of  Belgium, thus implying a slow 
death by starvation, of  pressing down on Poland with a primitive school education 
restricted to the ages of  7 to 12, without middle and higher schools, is the most 
diabolical that has ever been systematically devised in the history of  mankind.7
Every human community, whether family, state or union of  peoples, requires three 
preconditions: balance in revenues and expenses; law in the hands of  independent 
judges; immutable morality based on religion. No living German is able to prove 
that even just one of  these three prerequisites exists in Germany today. But if  
even just one of  them is lacking, breakdown in accordance with the law anchored 
in this nature by God is completely certain sooner or later. A tyrant can, as proven 
by history and by psychological observation, always erect only a tyranny; someone 
6 The National Socialist objective of  a reorganization of  Europe linked an aggressive expansionism with biological-racist 
politics of  national character. While eastern Europe, particularly Poland, was to serve as a new “settlement area” for 
Germans abroad, the north and west of  Europe were planned as extension of  the “Germanic Reich.” The resettle-
ment policies in the actual sense as a progression of  expulsion, extermination of  unwanted and settlement of  wanted 
segments of  the population were, however, strongly concentrated on Poland (right) from the start; cf. on this in detail 
Götz Aly, »Endlösung«. Völkerverschiebung und der Mord an den europäischen Juden, Frankfurt/M. 1995. In Alsace-Lorraine and 
in occupied northern France, it was first the practice to “evacuate” unwanted groups of  persons (besides Jews, Gypsies 
and others, this included criminals “of  foreign race,” homeless people and anti-German agitators) into the southern 
French area of  the Vichy government; on this in detail Lothar Kettenacker, Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik im Elsaß, 
Stuttgart 1973, especially pp. 249–267. In Scandinavia, on the other hand, which was defined as part of  the “northern 
European common destiny,” severe coercive measures constituted an exception. Due to the varying status of  the 
individual Scandinavian countries—while Denmark and Norway were occupied, Finland was at first an ally and Sweden 
maintained its neutrality—it was also easier for endangered segments of  the population to escape National Socialist 
persecution. Cf. Hans-Dietrich Loock, Nordeuropa zwischen Außenpolitik und »großgermanischer« Innenpolitik, in: Funke, Hitler, 
Deutschland und die Mächte, pp. 684–706, and Martin Moll, Die deutsche Propaganda in den besetzten »germanischen« Staaten. Nor-
wegen, Dänemark und Niederlande 1940–1945. Institutionen – Themen – Forschungsprobleme, in: Robert Bohn (ed.), Die deutsche 
Herrschaft in den »germanischen« Ländern 1940–1945, Wiesbaden 1997, pp. 209–245. In detail on Norway id.: Reichskommissa-
riat Norwegen. »Nationalsozialistische Neuordnung« und Kriegswirtschaft, Munich 2000.
7 The German occupation policy in Poland aspired to the “degradation of  the General Gouvernement to the reservoir 
of  a denationalized working population, robbed of  their leadership and culturally pressed down to an elementary level, 
half-free.” Cf. in detail Martin Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939–1945, Stuttgart 1961; quote from p. 22. 
Particularly in the west Polish regions annexed to Germany, the German rulers practiced an “education policy” that 
aimed at educating Polish children exclusively for a working life under German domination; cf. Bolesław Pleśniarski: 
Die Vernichtung der polnischen Bildung und Erziehung in den Jahren 1939–1945, in: Manfred Heinemann (ed.), Erziehung und 
Schulung im Dritten Reich. Part 1: Kindergarten, Schule, Jugend, Berufserziehung, Stuttgart 1980, pp. 160–175.
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who has brought about the conditions in administration and economy, in law and 
culture, in the upbringing of  youth and in morals in his own country—conditions 
which have yet to be described separately—or someone who has simply allowed 
these to develop, according to an immutable law of  nature does not become wise 
and moderate after his conquest, but rather ever more ambitious, brutal and ob-
sessed with conquest.
Far from only satisfying these three preconditions in Germany, the current sys-
tem—which in fact only dominates thanks to the soldiers—will directly or indi-
rectly introduce its lack of  principles, laws and inhibitions into all dominated areas. 
Preparations are in full swing; the transfer of  financial intemperateness is already 
comprised in its realization. Through this, however, not only are the motivation 
and energy of  the dominated peoples ever more meager, their life status will be 
increasingly repressed, their hate will become even deeper, but it is also impossible 
to trade the products that will have to be conveyed to this region for one or two 
decades; by the same token, the German people’s standard of  living, perhaps after 
a short-term rebound after sucking other peoples dry, must continue to fall.
It seems indeed possible that the United States of  America will make the first at-
tempt to trade with the “new” Europe; this is in accordance with their materialistic 
mindset and the naïve ideas they have about the link between business and politics. 
Such trade would be possible for a few years, namely as long as the gold found in 
Europe suffices. And then this illusion, too, would fall apart, because this Europe 
would not fulfill those indispensable prerequisites of  a state entity and of  econom-
ic life, but rather would sink into poverty.
What has been done so far to initiate this situation, which is only for the moment 
retreating behind the military successes, and is gradually but inexorably moving 
even more dominantly into the foreground, is quite considerable: destruction 
of  the intelligentsia and the German national traditions in the Baltic provinces, 
destruction of  the intelligentsia in Poland, Bukovina and Bessarabia, confusion 
and imminent famine in the western Balkans, destruction of  national freedom, 
beginnings of  hardship, more or less intense devastation that of  course needs to 
be removed with human manpower and that cannot carelessly be considered as 
nothing in Finland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium and France; beginning 
destruction of  the economy in Switzerland, beginning sinking into poverty and 
impending demoralization in Italy; destruction of  millions of  human lives, includ-
ing many women and children, destruction of  happiness of  millions of  families 
in all countries mentioned, shock to morality, to concepts of  honor, to law, to 
religious and psychological peace, a sweeping up into the leadership of  brutal 
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natures, of  opportunists and individuals lacking experience and knowledge.8 That 
thereby the best on the German side have been disappearing for years should not 
be underestimated in its consequences, after already losing the most honorable 
and bravest men in the world war. Thus, were one to set the task of  spreading 
bolshevism under narcosis, it would have to be resolved approximately in the style 
of  the development of  this liabilities side.
But it is not yet over. That Canada would follow the USA seems, taken superficial-
ly, tolerable; but the German element in North America would thus be squeezed 
into a hopeless position. It would be more appealing to the racial politician and 
the position of  the white race were Australia, New Zealand and Dutch India to 
fall to Japan, even if  the Japanese are currently indicating something different; that 
India would lapse into internal dissolution and thus finally 500 years of  European 
accomplishment—that lay before 1933, however—would be wiped out. Or does 
the conquest of  India perhaps beckon, the dream of  all tyrants who have so far 
blessed Europe with their—thank God—short-term entanglements?
That is, roughly, the picture given an optimum of  military successes! What, how-
ever, if  one of  the assumptions made on page 3 does not occur? It will be left to 
your consideration to clarify the consequences for each combination. They are 
implacable and only induce the inevitable breakdown even more quickly. Intoxi-
cating here, for instance, would be the possibility that Bolshevism appears on the 
Mediterranean, while the European continent starves.
That the collapse does not drag our people and nation into its maelstrom is the 
task before us. It will primarily be a moral one, because without morality there 
might be a happy personal or state existence worth living for others, but not for 
Germans. If  just for that reason, the first matter is to re-establish the morality that 
has been strongly shaken and is approaching gradual dissipation. It is based on re-
spect for God’s commandments. It has entrusted our conscience with clear orders. 
Let us make an end to the pernicious situation that is leading to ruin, with inex-
perience, insanity and crime deceiving the people of  their best, namely their soul. 
The people can do nothing against this deceit as long as those dark forces violently 
keep the people distant from the real facts and thus from proper recognition of  
the danger under the protection of  weapons. The task is not to be delayed towards 
the soldiers who are risking and have risked their lives for the nation and may not 
be abandoned in their homeland to emotional pauperization.
8 Cf. in summary on the economic exploitation through the National Socialist occupation policies Umbreit, Kontinen-
talherrschaft, pp. 121–135; 210–233. On the individual occupied states, cf. the collection of  essays from Gerhard Otto, 
Johannes Houwink ten Cate (ed.), Das organisierte Chaos. »Ämterdarwinismus« und »Gesinnungsethik«: Determinanten nationalso-
zialistischer Besatzungsherrschaft, Berlin 1999.
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“I consider it important to shatter the chains with which the bureaucracy is re-
stricting the recovery of  human activity, that spirit of  greed, of  impure advan-
tage, to destroy that dependency on the mechanical that dominates this form of  
government. One must accustom the nation to administering her own forces and 
business and emerge from that state of  childhood in which an ever more restive 
government wants to keep the people.” (letter from Baron vom Stein to Harden-
berg dated December 8, 1807.)9
“For the honest man, there is no salvation but in the conviction that the reprobate 
is capable of  all evil, and that one acts in accordance with this conviction with 
speed, decisiveness and perseverance. To have believed in the man about whom 
one said with so much truth that he has hell in his heart, chaos in his head, is more 
than self-deceit, it is a high degree of  foolishness. Unfortunately, the credulous-
ness of  the weak is just as inexhaustible as the ingeniosity of  the evil; without 
trusting the evil, the credulous can always be staved off  with hopes. ... If  then 
in this case nothing is to be expected but unhappiness and suffering, one should 
rather grasp a decision that is honorable and noble and that offers compensation 
and reasons for consolation in the case of  an evil success.” (memorandum by 
Baron vom Stein dated October 12, 1808.)10
9 The quote is from the letter with which Stein transmitted the Nassau memorandum to Hardenberg. In this context, the 
quotation forms a plea for principles of  self-administration. Cf. the reprint in the French original: Freiherr vom Stein. 
Briefe und Amtliche Schriften, newly edited by Walther Hubatsch, reworked by Peter G. Thielen, Vol. 2, Part 2: Das Reformmi-
nisterium (1807–1808), Stuttgart 1960, p. 561 et seq.
10 The quotation is from a memorandum of  Stein’s in which he argues against the ratification of  the Paris Treaty; the 
treaty achieved a link between evacuating Prussian areas and Prussian tribute payments. In the quote, Stein refers to 
Napoleon’s lack of  observance of  the treaty and pleads for a Prussian uprising against French domination; cf. the 
reprint ibid., pp. 889–891.
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